This study examines spatial variation in the price and accessibility (if fast food across a major urban area. We use novel data on the price ol a rcpresentalivc last-fcMxl mciti and Ihc location of fasi-ftxKi restaurants belonging lo one of three major chains in ihe Disiriet of Columbia and if.s surrounding suburbs. These dala are used lo lest a structural model of spiifial (.-ompcliliiin. The results of this study are easily itilerpreted and compared with a pasf ;inalysis. We lind dial spuiial differences in costs and demand conditions drive variation in ihc nutnber of firms operating in a market, which in tum affects prices.
Introduction
Who pays more lor food? This question ha.s been a subject of debate among researchers. Most focus on prices at supermarkets and other grocers and ask whether retail food prices tend to be higher in maricets with a greater proportion of lower income consumers, minority consumers, or consumers with some other trait. Recent studies include Kauffnan et al. (1997) . Hayes (2000) . Frankcl and Gould (2(K)I). as well as MacDonald and Nelson (l'>y!) . A few other studies have examined prices al restaurants, such as Lafontaine (1995) , Graddy (1997) . Jekanowski (1998), and Thomadsen (2003) .
Being able to explain variation in average retail fmxi prices could be useful for government agencies engaged in price measurement. However, it has also been a goal of researchers who are concerned with social equity. According to Graddy (1997) , there is a perception that retailers engage in unfair commercial practices in lower income, minority neighborhoods. She poinis out that retail establishments have been targeted during some riols in urban centers.
Empirical evidence does conlinn some systematic dispersion of prices. According to Kaufman et al. (1997) , who conducted a review of 14 prior studies, grocery prices tend to be higher in urban centers than in suburban markets. Some speculate that greater access to supcmiarkcts in the suburbs is responsible. As compared with central-city stores, supermarkets are argued lo offer ihe lowest prices and the greatest range of brands, package sizes, and quality choices. MacDonald and Nelson (1991) find that a fixed market basket of goods costs about 4% less in suburban locations ihan in central-city stores. However, they concede Ihat their analysis is not based firmly in economic theory; rather it is only exploratory, due to the lack of a preci.se model.
Studies have been less successful at explaining how and why prices might vary with the demographic characteristics of a market. First, recent studies of grocery prices have reached mixed results. For example. Hayes (2()(K)) docs not identify a statistically signilicam relationship between grocery prices and the income level of a market's residents. By contrast. Frankel and Gould (2001) find that prices are highest in market.^ with more income inequality. In other words, prices are found to be highest where there arc more lower income or more higher income households. The lowest prices are found in markets with more consumers in between these two groups. Second, even when they are significant, there is the problem of interpreting e.stimation results. For example, the model of Frankel and Gould (2(X)1) does noi allow those authors to detennine whether their findings are due to differences in consumer behavior, costs, or difference.s in the characteristics of stores and ihe quality of the services they provide.
Similar results have been obtained by researchers studying restaurant prices. For example, Graddy (1997) find.s that prices are higher in neighborhoods with a higher prt)portion of black and lower income consumers. However, her model does not identify whether the observed dispersion of prices stems from differences in co.sts and demand conditions or whether it reflects discriminatory pricing strategies among retailers.
Utilizing a novel set of data on the price of a fast-food meal and the location of fast-food restaurants in a major urban area, this study te.sts the structural mt>del of spatial competition developed by Salop (1979) . Estimation results based on this model can be easily interpreted. According to this model, cost and demand conditions first detennine how many stores choose to locate in a market. Holding all other factors constant, the more fimis in a market, the greater access consumers will have lo establishments on average. Greater access is defined to mean that consumers will have lower transportation costs and better substitutes for the .services of any particular store. Stores will likewi.se have less market power and price more competitively.
This study focuses on fast-foi>d prices because the authors believe such an analysis may be more easily undertaken than studies of grocery prices. Arguably, iwo different outlets affiliated with the same fasi-food chain supply relatively homogeneous goods and services. This fact may alleviate the possibility that differences in store fonnats are confounding the results of studies on grtK'cry prices. such as central cily stores being smaller or offering a nanower range of goods and services than suburban supennarkets.'
The results of this study show that cost and demand factors influence prices through their effect on access. For example, consider a community where an increase occurs in demand, such as through an increa.se in the population or in the income of existing residents. Holding all eise constant, this study linds that limis would likely respond by opening more outlets in the community. Consumers would then have more and better substitutes for the services of any particular store. In tum. restaurants would have more competitors, less market power, and charge slightly lower prices. In this way, low population levels and low levels of income might be associated with not only more limited access, but also higher prices. Moreover, we show that the reduced form of our model closely resembles the type of model estimated in past studies, including Gruddy (1997) . against which we compare our results.
' For example, in examining grocery prices, MacDonald and NeKon i I99h tind ii necessary to control for the type of retail format at wbicb grtK-eries arc purcbased. Vjiriables include wtielher tbe reiail store is a .supermarket or a warebouse club, tbe size of a siorc in square feet, and the SLOpc of services offered by a siore. such as wbether there is a delicatessen and a meat or scafixHl counter. By contrast, the autbors feel that these types of variation do not confound analyses of fast food prices. Two McDonald's restaurants in separate locations have a relatively nimilar format and offer a relatively similar range of goods and services.
Theoretical Framework
In models of spatial monopolistic competition, consumers are dispersed over a market area that is represented with a line, circle, or olher geometric form. Hotelling (1929) proposes a linear market, while Salop (1979) extends Hotelling s model and develops a circular market with an outside, homogeneous good. In that model, the homogeneous good is supplied by a competitive industry. In addition, there are also spatially disix^rsed firms, which share a common fixed cost, incur a constant marginal cost of production, antl sell a second product. The supply of this second good is monopolistically competitive. A nurnber of researchers have further expanded on models of spatial competition, including work by Capozza and Van Order (1978 . 1980 ), MacLeod. Norman, and Thisse (1988 . Rath and Zhao (2001) . and Puu (2002) .
In Salop's (1979) model, a consumer's costs for purchasing the second good include the retail price (i.e.. the mill price) and his or her costs for transportation to a retail store." It is a.ssumed that only if the total cost of obtaining the second item is below the consumer's reservation cost will the consumer purchase a given number of tinits of this good.' The consumer will buy only the homogeneous good otherwise. Significant transportation costs can therefore prevent suppliers of the second good from concentrating all of their production in one location. Customers may incur a prohibitively large cost for travel to this concentrated site.
Competition among suppliers of the .second good is imperfect in the model of Salop (1979) . Because they incur i\ nonzero cosi of transportation, consumers prefer to patronize the nearest firm if mill prices are equal. The demand for goods from firm / is then a function of the price of / and the price of all other finns that are sufficiently close to /. Using this model, Salop (1979) derives the demand schedule facing a representative firm and shows that prices for the second good are a function of transportation costs due to their impact on a firm's market power.
Prices for the second goml may decrease with the number of firms in a market under some assumptions about firm behavior. Salop (1979) shows that, as the number of firms in a market increases, each firm will be spatially closer to one of its rivals. Consumers may have more and better substitutes for the goods offered by any single firm. In general, the price charged by firm ( will move closer to I's marginal cost. A necessary assumption about Hnn behavior is that each finn chooses a best price, given the perception that all other firms hold their prices constant.** Empirical evidence that prices tend to decrease with the ntimber of finns in a market has been pnwidcd by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) .
The number ol linns in a market is detemiined in advance of prices. In the model of Salop (1979) . just enough firms enter a market so that, once prices are later determined, economic profits will be zero.*^ The resulting equilibrium is termed a symmetric zero-profit Nash equilibrium. For It is assumed ibai all pairons of the same store pay ibc same mill price. For a discussion of how a limi mighl price discriminate among its consumers, see MacLeod. Nnnnan. and Thisse [ 19Xli) . They derive the subgame perfect equilibrium in a two-stage game in which firms adjusl their mil! prices according to a consumer's costs for iransponation. It is shown that firms may charge higher prices to their nearest consumer.*., for wbom farther away stores are a relatively poor substitute. Sucb consumers face a relatively high cost differentia) lor traveling lo ibeir nearest store and ibe next nearest one. By conirasi. tbis cost differential is relaiively small for consumers wbo aa" located a relatively tar distance from any store. Salop claims that bis model can he njadily extended to consider clastic demand. For example, see Puu (2(N) 2) as well as Rath and Zhao |2IK)1). who demonstnite ibe i-qtiilibna in mudels of a linear marker '' Capoz/a and Van Order i I97S| presem a general case allowing for a wider range of assumplion.s aboui linn behavior. ' Firms in the model of .Salop 11979t are ponable. As further argued in Cnpoir/a and Van Order II9S0). portability requires tbat firms can relocate when new firms enter a market. However, if existing firms are immobile, then tbis equilibrium condition musi he restated such that lirms will enter a market if and only if they can expect to m^e positive economic profits. In other words, entp.' is sequentially rational. instance, given a distribution of firms that are poised to make zero economic profits, a decrease in fixed costs or an increase in demand would allow for positive economic profits. New fimis will then enter the market, and. in tum. each firm's market share will decrease. Expected profits then fall with market shares. This process will continue until all finns can once again expect to earn only a zero economic profit.
In this study, we use the model of Salop (1979) to motivate a system of structural equations that serve as the basis for an empirical analysis. We assume that there are M circular markets and consumers in each market are spatially dispersed, We denote the aggregate demand of consumers in each of these markets. /;/ = 1. .... M. as /),". We allow D^, to var>' with the number of consumers in each market. Moreover, we allow the demand for fast food to depend on the stxial and demographic characteristics of the consumers. However, for prices below the consumer's reservation cost, quantity demanded does not vary wiih price: rather, consumer demand is inelastic. Consumers pay the retail price and incur a nonzero cost for traveling to restaurants. In market m. let the number of re.staurants be N,,, and all other factors thai influence transportation costs be T^. There is free entry, and Nn, is determined such that economic profits are zero. Also, we assume that the fixed cost associated with operating a restaurant varies across markets, but not within niarkeis. Lei this fixed cost in markel m be C, Contitiuing to fbiiow Salop (1979) , ue hypothesize that N,,, is decreasing in C^ but increasing in D,,, and T,,,. Thus, our model of N,,, is N,,,=NiC.,,.D,,,,t,,) .
(1)
Similarly, we allow for the possibility that prices in a market depend on the marginal costs of firms in that market ^MC",) as well as N,,, and T,,,. The price of a meal in market m. P"" is then P^=P{MC,,..t,.N,,,) .
( 2) where Equations 1 and 2 represent a system of simultaneous (triangular) equations. Finally, if one desires, we note thai Equation I can be substituted into Equation 2 to obtain a reduced form equation for fast-food price, P,,, =P{MC, , , .T~, X^.D, , X (3) where N,,, no longer appears as a separate regressor. This equation approximates the reduced form model used in Graddy (1997) .''
Data and Kmpirical Model
We next document our data sourees and develop an empirical representation of the equations in the previous section. We collected data t)n the prices and locations of McDonald's, Burger King, and Wendy's restaurants in the District of Columbia and its surrounding suburbs.^ We identified stores '' Following the notation in this study, the dependent variable inthe model of Graddy (1997) is the price of food at resiaurant > in zip code ni A notable differcnee between this specification and thai of Salop(l979i is thai (he mtxiel of Graddy (1997) treats individtial stores as the level of analysis, not tbe markei. Explanalory variables in the model of Clriiddy (1997) include a lew store-specilk controls, such as (be number of employees, as well as many /.ip code-level proxies for costs, the competitive environment, and ibe demographic characioristits of a /.ip code's residents, such as their race and income level. The.se suburhs include Montjiomcij-and Prince George's counties in Maryland as well as Fairfax County, Arlington County, and Alexandria City in Virginia.
using local telephone directories, web-based lelephone directories, and company websites.^ Tn total, we identified 32K restaurants and collected price infomiation on 253 of them during the late summer and fall of 2002.'' At each of these stores, we recorded the price of a number one value meal, which includes a hamburger sandwich, a soda, and fries. Among McDonald's and Burger King restaurants, value meals were sold in medium, large, and extra-large sizes. We priced the large size. However, among Wendy's restaurants, value meals were sold in only two sizes, a regular size and Biggie. We priced the regular size. Finally, we supplemented our price and location data with information on the economic and demographic characteristics of the zip codes in which restaurants are located. Some of these data were taken from Census 2000, including the number of people living in the zip code, the racial and ethnic characteristics of residents, the median household income, the average age of residents, and the proportion of households containing children. Other data were taken from Realtor.com, a website with real-estate listings, including the median value of homes in a zip code. Finally, we obtained data on the size of each zip code in square miles from the ArcView software package. Complete data could be collected for 97 zip codes in which we also had located restaurants.'"
As an initial step, we demonstrate that there exists a dispersion of prices and accessibility in the region under study. Table 1 shows that the mean number of restaurants belonging to one of the three chains was 3.08, with a standard deviation of 1.68 among the 97 zip codes used in our analysis. As for price dispersion. Figure I further shows the distribution of prices at McDonald's and Burger King establishments in our sample. Sampled restaurants affiliated with McDonald's were frequently charging $4.09 or $4.19 for a large, number one value meal. At the same time, other stores were selling this same meal for as little as $3,89 and as much as $4.56. Similarly, restaurants affiliated with Burger King were frequently found to be charging $4.79 for their large, number one value meal. However, we also observed prices as low as $4.29 and as high as S5,09, By contrast, among restaurants affiliated with the Wendy's chain, all sampled establishments were charging $3.99 for a regular, number one meal.'' Following Graddy (1997) and Lafontaine (1995) , we next assume that separate zip codes arc separate markets.'' For each market, we calculate the average price (without tax) of a meal, P",, as Each of ihe thret-fust fotid chalti,s under study has a i-e,staurant locator on their website. We t;ollected prices by visiiing restaurants and by phoning restaurants. Among restaurants confacted by telephone, unusual priL-e mfomiation was i.-tin tinned by rephoning or visiting ihe est;*bli,shmeni, Colictling accurate price data by ieiephone can be problematic. Graddy (1997) used data collected by Card and Krueger (1994) and itote,s how oiher researchers have found problems with these data. She cites one researcher, Lavin (1995) , who comments that restaurant employees do not appear to have always given accurate price data. For instance, some employee,s at Burger King restaurants may have reponed the price for a Whopper when asked lor the price of a regular hamburger. We formulated our sampling strategy to minimi^x; this problem. However, because of lime constraints, we ultimately could not obt;iiri reliable price data on all e,stablishments. For some markets in wbich we had idemitied resiauranis. we couid not obtain pertinent dala about the zip axJe. such as the cost of a home. ITiea-were ,1(K) restaurants in ihe 97 zip codes for which we had complete dala. Our price dala covered 240 of these MX) outlets.
This result might surprise some readers who would expect to pay the same price at iwo restaurants affiliated with Ihe same chain. However, it is iniporlain to consider that itiost fast-food restaurants are owned and operated by Iranehisees. Moreover, resale price maintenance is illegal in the United States. In odier words, large restaurant companies have direct control over prices at only compatiy-owned outlets. Franchisees are free to set their own prices. While Lafontaine (1995) finds that prices vary even across company-owned siores. price dispersion is greatesi atnong establishments owned hy franchisees. The use of zip cixles lo proxy for markets is admittedly imperfect. Instead of assuming a 7,ip code to approximate a market, Thomadsen (200, ?) Ireats the size of a market as endogenous. Thai model facilitates his analysis of price competition among restaurants. However, the mode! of Thomadsen i2()0_l) focuses on the second stage of a location-price game. In other words, he analyze,s Ihe prices charged hy tinns, given that they have entered the market. He does not consider how access to fast food can vaiy wiih the demographic characteristics of a market's residents, sueh as iheir income level, or the determinants of fixed costs in a market, .such a.s the cost of housing. Proportion of residents considering themselves to be Hispanic Proportion of residents considering themselves to be black well as the number of restaurants affiliated wiih any of the three restaurant chains, Nn,. The.se two variables serve as the dependent variables in our analysis.
Among the explanatory variables in the empirical specification of our model, we proxy for fixed costs, C",, in Equation 1 with the median price of a house, measured in hundreds of thousands of As mentioned earlier, we amid not obtain price d^ta on all n;staurants in all zip cixles. In ihcsc cases, P^ is the average price of a meal at rcsiaurants from which prices were obtained. However, /V,,, remains ihc ntimber of reslauranis in tlic iip code, regardless of wbether price data were obtained on eacb establisbmenl. ' As noted in fooinote fi. unlike Oraddy (19971. we aggregate our data to the zip-fode level. We tecl that this approach better reflects the model of Salop (1979) . which is of a market, not of a lirm. Moreover, as discussed below, our independent variables incltide the income level of a market's residents, the number of people living in a markel, and other characteristics of Ihe market in which a re.staurani is lotaied. It follows (bai. if we had modeled ihe prices charged by individual stores, there would hyve been almost no variatiiiti in ihe value of the independent variables assticiated wiih different siores in the .same zip cixle. Only if two stores in the same zip code belong to different chains could there have been sume variation in the value of an indicator variable for store affiliation. Moulton (I9S61 has shown that estimation, using a cross-sectioti of daia in which many ohscrvations share the same (or similar* values for iheir inttepenJent variables, can lead to an underestimation of the standard error on Ibe coefficients. Aggregating our data to the zip-code level further removes tbis possibility. Notably, a majority of all prices were observed ai the upper-end of their depicted price interval. In other words, more prices ended in a nine, such as $3.99, than in any other number like one ($3.91) or iwo ($3.92) dollars, HOUSE. We hypothesize that the tiutnber of restaurants in a market is decreasing in fixed costs, and therefore, so is HOUSE.^^ We also include several variables in Equation I to account for aggregate demand, D,,,. Detnand is thought to depend on the number of consumers in the market and so we include the zip code population in tens of thousands of people. POP. Following McCracken and Brandt (1987) , Byrne, Capps, and Saha (1998). and Stewart et al. (2004) . we also include variables shown to influence per capita spending on fast food. These include the median income of residents measured in tens of thousands of dollars {INCOME), the median age of residents {AGE), and the proportion of households with a child (KIDS).
In the estimation of tlie model, we also experimenied wiih stparatt-dummy variables for whether a restaurant was located in the District of Columbia. Montgomery County, Prince George's (.'oimty. Fairfax County, Arlington County, or Alexandria City. The reason is ihat insurance rates tend lo vary by couniy and past researchers have asked whether these rates impact tixed costs. However, in our sludy. these vjuiablcs were never significant nor did they inliuence the sign and significance of other variables in the model.
We also use several variables to proxy for factors other than N,,, thought to affect the cost of transportation in a market, l),,.^^ In particular, it i.s hypothesized that residents of rural, suburban, and urban areas may have different costs for transportation. Some rural areas are geographically larger than urban ones. Holding all else constant, it follows that residents of rural areas may tend to travel farther distances than their urban counterparts. However, residents of urban areas may be less likely to own a car and, if they do drive, have more difficulty parking or face more congested roads. Thus, we created dummy variables to proxy for the three types of community. RURAL = 1 for markets outside the Beltway with fewer than 1500 residents per square mile, and RURAL = 0 for all other zip codes.'^ CITY is coded similarly except that it identifies inner-city markets with more than 9000 residents per square mile inside the Beltway. Including these two variables in the model, we contrast areas classified as RURAL and CITY with more suburban communities, SUBURBAN, the reference market.
In the empirical specification of Equation 2, we include A^^,, RURAL, and CITY to control for other transportation co.sts, T,,,. and variables accounting for differences in marginal costs, MC,,,. Variables controlling for marginal costs include three binary indicators of the county In which a zip code is located. These are MNT= I if the market (zip code) is in Montgomery County, Maryland, and 0 otherwise; VA=\ if the market is anywhere in Virginia, and 0 otherwise; PG = 1 if the market is in Prince George's County. Maryland, and 0 otherwise.'** Markets in the District of Columbia. DC. serve as the reference market. Marginal costs can he expected to vary by county because the counties have different sales tax rates and, very likely, different wage rates.
We also allow marginal costs to vary across chains. The marginal cost at McDonald's may differ from that at Burger King, for example. If so, because we aggregate our data to the zip-code level, it follows that the average level of marginal costs in a zip code will depend on the portion of all restaurants belonging to each chain. Thus, we include in MC,,, the proportion of restaurants used in the calculation of P^ belonging to McDonald's (MCD) , Burger King (BK), and Wendy's (WNDY).
We assume a linear relationship between variables, and substituting the relevant variables Into Equations 1 and 2 yields the following set of triangular equations: N = 0k) + i\ClTY + I2RURAL + :t^HOUSE + ^INCOME + ^i^KlDS 4-^(,AGE + i^PQP.
(4) P = Pn + 3,M/Vr + ^.VA + pi/'G + ^^WNDY + ^^BK + ^^CITY + ^^RURAL + ^^N.
Appending Equations 4 and 5 with stochastic error terms creates the equations that are the basis for our econometric analysis. If these error terms have zero covariance. then perfonning ordinary least squares (OLS) on each equation separately will provide consistent estimates of the parameters {0(o -0(7, po -PM). However, the estimated parameters in Equation 5 will be inconsistent otherwise (e.g., Lahiri and Schmidt 1978) . Hausman (1978) demonstrates that his test for misspecification is appropriate to test for zero covariance between the error terms. For this study, we performed the version of the Hausman test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) . We used POP. HOUSE, INCOME, AGE, and KIDS as instruments for N. We assume these instruments to be related to N. but
We tried including the proportion of residents without a car. It was highly collinear with/WCCM£ as well as with the variables RURAL and CITY, discussed in this paragraph. The Beltway is a highway encircling ihe District of Columbia and its inner suhurbs. In place of l-'^. we also tried using separate indicator variables for Fairfax County. ,A.rlingion County, and Alexandria City, These places are ail in Virginia, However, with ihe exception of Faidax County, they are also relaliveiy small in geographic teniis. Likewise, we had few observations for Arlington County ;md .Alexandria City, which tnay help lo explain wby these variables were never individually statistically significant. For example, our data include only three zip codes in Arlington Counly. any linear combination of them to be exogenous to P. We failed to reject the null hypothesis that OLS provides consistent estimates of the parameters in Equation 5. The coefticient on the hrsi stage residtjals was 0.0036. with a standard erTor of 0.0137 (/' value = 0,7917). Estimating the triangular system of Equations 4 and 5 using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) procedure is an unrestricted approach compared with estimating each equation separately by OLS. Moreover, it has been shown that, even if N were endogenous in the equation for P. iterated SUR will provide consistent and efficient parameter estimates, ignoring the simultaneity (Greene 1997, p. 736-7) . This result is attributed to Lahiri and Schmidt (1978) . Thus, we estimated Equations 4 and 5 using an iterated SUR procedure.'*Â second consideration wa.s the potential for collinearity among explanatory variables. Graddy (1997) encountered this problem and concedes that it may have affected some of her estimation results. Indeed, in this study, there is also a significant correlation among many of the proxies for costs and demand conditions. A correlation matrix is provided in Table 2 . Among variables sharing a potentially troublesome correlation, for example, are INCOME and HOUSE. Housing prices tend to be greater in markets with higher income households.
Because muUicollinearity between explanatory variables can affect estimation results (Greene 1997) . we report results from entering transportation cost, marginal cost, fixed cost, and demand variables sequentially in Table 3 . The tirst pair of columns contains estimation results when only transportation costs are included in the model. The second pair of columns provides the estimated coefficients and their standard errors when variables controlling for tnarginal costs are added to those for transportation costs. By contrast, the third, founh. and fifth pairs of columns contain all variables in the structural model except proxies for demand conditions, fixed costs, and marginal costs, respectively. Estimation results for [he full empirical model (specificalion 6). which most closely approximates the structural model of Salop (1979) . are contained in the sixth pair of columns in Table 3 .
Finally, we supplement the model in specification 6 with BLACK and HISPANIC, which measure the proportion of households considering themselves to belong to each group, and are derived from Census 2000.""' While not strictly suggested by Salop's ihcorctical model, we include '" Ti) be sure, estimatit«i by Ot-S, iieratcd SUR. and even lwo-si;ige least squares (TSLSt yicliied similar results. OLS and TSLS results arc available froni Ihc authors on request. '" Ii I'luild bc urguod ihiit these rucial anil elhnic variables htlong anmny iho proxies Ibr demand iimdiiiuiis. tlowever them in our empirical model tor the sake of comparison with past studies and to determine whether prices might be higher or lower in communities with a greater proportion of minorities. These estimation results are presented in Ihe Table 4 .
Findings
The data appear to fit the model well. As shown in ihc (irst five pairs of columns in Table 3 , coefficients on explanatory variables change little in sign or magnitude across specifications. Note that INCOME is not statistically significant when HOUSE is not included (specification 4). Because the variables INCOME and HOUSE arc positively correlated, bul their coefficients have opposing signs in theory, it is likely that without HOUSE. INCOME is biased toward zero. For the empirical specitication that most closely approximates Salop's theory, as shown iti the linal pair of columns in Table 3 , the value of R' in the equation for N is 0.338 and that in the equation for P is 0.708.'' We now examine the results for this specification and then consider the impact of supplementing the empirical specification of our structural model with racial and ethnic variables.
Among our estimation results for Equation 4, we tind that the number of restaurants in a market is decreasing in fixed costs, as the coefficient on HOUSE is negative and significant at the 5% level. In particular, we find that an increase in the median price of a home of $100,(K}0 will cause a market to have about 0.33 fewer restaurants. Theoretically, if fixed costs rise and demand is held constant, there is a decrease in the number of restaurants that can make a normal economic profit in a market.
There is also empirical evidence that the number of restaurants is increasing in the aggregate demand for fast food. For example, the coeflicient on POP is positive and significani at ihe 5% level. An increase in population size of 10,000 people will cause the number of fast-food restaurants in a market to rise by about 0.7 establishments. INCOME is also statistically significant at the 10% level, if we control for HOUSE. In general, if demand rises and fixed costs are held constant, there is an increase in the number of restaurants that can make a normal economic profit in a market. To be sure, this result is best interpreted as a short-run effect. It is unlikely that, in the long run, real-estate prices would remain constant following an increase in a market's population or in the income of its residents.
The results may be better understood with a simple example. Consider the number of restaurants in zip code 20837, Poolesville. and in zip code 20705, Beltsville. Both communities are relatively large when measured in total area. Poolesville occupies 43.29 square miles of Maryland, while Beltsville accounts for 19.23 square miles. However, a retailer's fixed costs are likely to be higher in Pooiesville. The median value of a home is about $265,000 in Poolesville as compared with about $146,000 in Beltsville. Demand may also be greater in Beltsville, where about 23.000 people live. The total population of Poolesville is Just 6000. The implication is that, although Beltsville is smaller in area, its lower fixed costs and higher aggregate demand support five of the selected fast-food estabhshments, while market characteristics in Poolesville support only one.
Our estimation results for Equation 5 (specification 6. column P) suggest that the average price of fast food is decreasing in the number of restautants. The coefficient on N,,, is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The entry of a finn into a market brings down the average price of a meal by about $0,02. However, arguably, this change in price is small relative to the total price of a meal. On this matter, our study appears to agree with Graddy (1997), who finds that restaurants in markets with three or fewer fast-food outlets charge about 2,4% more than stores in zip codes with four or more outlets.
It further follows from the statistical significance of the coefficient on A' ,,, in Equation 5 that a relationship exists between prices and spatial differences in costs and demand conditions. We can calculate the marginal effect of a variable in Equation 4 on the price. Eirst consider the marginal effect Ciilfulatcd for each equation using tliL' cstimiited SUR coefficienls. As shown in Table 3 , Ihe resulting values of R' do not necessarily decrea.se for both equations, if a variable is remiwedlrom ihc model. Tbiscouiiterintuiiive result LIUI occur because we are minimizing the generalized sum of squares and is among ihe many short comings associated with measures uf R' in generalized linear models le.g., Greene 1997). of HOUSE. Theory predicts that increases in fixed costs should drive firms out of a market and prices may go up. In fact, we find thai OP ON -= (-0,0190)(-0.3315) ^0.0063.
ON OHOUSE ^ ' '
A $100.(XX) increa.se in the median price of a home implies an increase of almost $0.01 in the average price of a meal. Furthermore, using the means presented in Table I , it is possible to calculate the elasticity of price with respect to the median cost of housing. Doing so. we find that a 10% increase iti median housing prices causes a 0.04'>f increa.se in fasl-food prices. Similarly, it could be asked wheiher prices are relatively higher in lower income neighborhoods. Thai is, the marginal effeci of
In words, a $10,000 increase in the median income of a market's residents will cause the average price of a fast-food meal lo decrease by less than SO.OI. As measured in tenns of an elasticity, a 10% increase in the median income of households is associated with a 0.08% decrease in fast-food prices.
Our results further appear lo agree with Graddy (1997) on the marginal effects oi' INCOME and HOUSE. Graddy (1997) also finds that prices are increasing with the cost o( housing and, controlling for housing costs, decreasing in ihe median income of residents. For instance, in some speciticalions of her model. Graddy (1997) finds that a 10% increase in ihe median income of a zip code's residents is associated with a 1.57% decrease in the price of a fast-food meal.
On the subject of the racial and ethnic composition of markets, our study does not agree with the results of Graddy (1997) . As shown in Table 4 . when racial and ethnic variables are added to our model, controlling for costs and demand conditions, we find no evidence that prices are higher or access is more limited in neighborhoods with a greater proportion of minority residents. The coefficients on BLACK and HISPANIC are not statistically significant. There are several possible explanations for why the two studies differ on this result. Arguably, because both analyses are case studies of two different urban areas, each could be a regional phenomenon. For example, there could be differences in how racial and ethnic variables happen lo be correlated with proxies for costs or demand conditions, which we have found to influence the number of firms in a market.~" While many of our results agree with those of Graddy (1997). we believe it is interesting to compare ihe results of estimating our empirical specification of Equations I and 2 simultaneously with results of estimating an empirical specification for our reduced form Equation 3, when the racial and ethnic variables, BLACK and HISPANIC, are again included in the model. As shown in Table 5 , the direction of the marginal effects on key variables does not change. However, we find that fewer of the variables are statisiically significant. For instance, the estimated coefficient on HOUSE is positive white the coefficients on INCOME and POP are negative. However, only HOUSE and POP are significani at the 5 or 10% levels, while INCOME becomes insignificant. Arguably, the greater shortcoming associated with estimating a reduced form model is that this approach provides no insights into why fasl-food prices are lower in communities with less expensive housing or greater population levels. In contrast, our structural equations clearly show the mechanism at work. 
Conclusions
We utilize a unique set of data to estimate a model of accessibility and pricing among fast-food restaurants in metropolitan Washington, DC. We find that the sociodemographic profile of a cotiimunity influences the number, and therefore the accessibility, of fast-food restaurants in Ihat market, and prices may move slightly through spatial differences in access. We also compare our results on price dispersion with the findings of a past .study. In general, we find quite a lot of agreement between our study and the past analysis. One notable exception is Ihe effect of race and ethnicity.
The model tested in this study allows for a much richer interpretation of the results than do models tested in past analyses. As a Hnal illustrative exercise, we consider two hypothetical markets and assume that consumers in both markets have the same aggregate demand for fast food, but tixed costs are higher in one market than in the other. We denote these markets as the high-cost and low-cost markets, respectively. Next, assuming all else constant, we use the results of this study to argue that N is decreasing in C. that is, /Vh,^i,-a.M *^ ^um-o>si-'l follows that individual tirms in the high-cost market are likely serving more meals than individual tirms in the low-cost market. Recall our assumption that firms incur a constant marginal cost of production. Based on this assumption, it follows that the average cost of production will decline with output. As such, it is possible that firms in the high-cost market have aboul the same average cost as firms in the low-cost market. The former spread these fixed costs over more meals. Finally, because price equals average cost is an equilibrium condition, it follows that prices need not vary much with fixed costs. It would be sufficient that the number of firms varies, thereby explaining the findings of this study and other researchers of little variation in average prices with proxies for costs and demand.
However, even if the impact is small, we do find that average prices vary with hxed costs and demand. Continuing with our above example, we know that consumers in the high-cost market will have less access, continuing to hold all other factors constant. In tum, restaur;uits in the community have fewer competitors and. ihus. more market power. To be sure, we again note that the extent of this latter impact appears to be small. Prices move slightly with differences in accessibility.
This study ha.s examined accessibility and pricing for fast food because the authors believe that such an analysis may be more easily undertiikcn than studies of grocery prices. However, it follows that the results of this study cannot be t^eadily extended to explaining the conduct of supermaiicets or even other types of restaurant, such as full-service ones. That would require controlling for differences in store formats and differences in the qualities of goods .sold. Therefore, a goal of future analysis might be to incorporate such factors into a structural model o( monopolistic competition, where results are easily interpreted.
